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Note
KOKESH v. SEC: THE SUPREME COURT REDEFINES AN
EFFECTIVE SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT TOOL
CONOR DALY
The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC” or “Commission”)
possesses expansive powers to enforce the securities laws of the United
States.1 Among those powers is the SEC’s ability to disgorge the wrongful
profits of those who violate federal securities laws.2 Despite the Commission’s broad powers, the general statute of limitations, Section 2462,3 restricts the time frame in which the SEC can seek certain civil remedies for
misconduct.4 In Kokesh v. SEC,5 the Supreme Court of the United States
determined whether the five-year statute of limitations for enforcement proceedings applies when the SEC seeks disgorgement of a defendant’s illgotten profits.6 The Supreme Court held that disgorgement “operat[ed] as a
penalty” under the statute of limitations, and therefore, the SEC must commence an enforcement action within five years of the date of the wrongdoing in order to successfully seek disgorgement.7
The Court reached the correct decision in this case because the SEC
used the disgorgement remedy to punish defendants for wrongs against the
United States and to deter others from committing the same violations.8
Further, the Supreme Court correctly found that the SEC did not utilize the
civil remedy to compensate victims for their losses or merely return defend© 2018 Conor Daly.

J.D. Candidate, 2019, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. The author would like to thank the Maryland Law Review Editorial Staff, including Meagan George,
Jonathan Tincher, Alex Botsaris, Caroline Covington, Catherine Gamper, and Dan Scapardine for
their help with writing and editing this piece. The author would also like to thank Professor René
Reich-Graefe for his valued insight and enthusiasm and his family and friends that continuously
support and motivate him through all of his endeavors.
1. SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 1984).
2. See id. at 201 (describing disgorgement as belonging within the “catalogue of permissible
equitable remedies” available to the SEC).
3. 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (2012).
4. Gabelli v. SEC, 568 U.S. 442, 449, 451–52, 454 (2013) (holding that the discovery rule
does not apply to § 2462 when the SEC seeks civil penalties against defendants over five years
after the alleged securities fraud occurred).
5. 137 S. Ct. 1635 (2017).
6. Id. at 1640–41.
7. Id. at 1645.
8. See infra Part II.A.
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ants to where they were before their misconduct.9 The Court’s decision,
however, will likely burden the SEC’s enforcement capabilities because the
Commission now has less settlement leverage for violations over five years
old.10 Further, while this decision will likely restrain the SEC’s Division of
Enforcement, it may also lead to substantially larger costs for defendants
that are ordered to disgorge their illegal profits, since civil penalties are
likely not covered by insurance policies or deductible under the Internal
Revenue Code.11
I. BACKGROUND
Section I.A of this Part discusses the formation and responsibilities of
the Securities and Exchange Commission, as well as the Commission’s
power to enforce federal securities laws. Section I.B discusses the purpose
and application of the statute of limitations for enforcing civil penalties12
and the Supreme Court’s interpretation of “penalty” under other federal
laws in prior cases. Section I.C describes the procedural background of
Kokesh v. SEC. Section I.D summarizes the reasoning of the Supreme
Court in holding that Section 2462 applies to disgorgement orders.
A. The Origins, Purpose, and Powers of the SEC
After the stock market crash in 1929 and the resulting Great Depression, Congress passed a series of laws13 designed to prevent the abuses14 in
the securities industry that contributed to the economic downfall of America in the 1930s.15 Congress’s main intention for passing these new regulatory schemes was to “achieve a high standard of business ethics in the securities industry.”16 Specifically, Congress enacted the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 “[t]o provide for the regulation of securities exchanges” and “to
9. See infra Part II.B.
10. See infra Part II.C.1.
11. See infra Part II.C.2.
12. 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (2012) (“[A]n action, suit or proceeding for the enforcement of any
civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise, shall not be entertained unless commenced within five years from the date when the claim first accrued . . . .” (emphasis added)).
13. Such legislation included the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2012), the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C §§ 78a–78pp (2012), the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79-79 (repealed 2005), the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77aaa–77bbbb(2012), the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1–80a64(2012), and the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1–80b-21 (2012). SEC v.
Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963).
14. Though many actions were proscribed under these acts, examples of abuses which Congress sought to prevent include investment advisers sharing in the profits of their clients or engaging in activities that would impact an adviser’s ability to give impartial investment advice to their
clients. Capital Gains, 375 U.S. at 189 (citing H.R. DOC. NO. 477, at 67, 29 (1940)).
15. Id. at 186.
16. Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 73-85 (1933)).
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prevent inequitable and unfair practices on such exchanges.”17 Under these
laws, the SEC has broad authority to investigate potential violations of federal securities laws and issue subpoenas18 for evidence related to an investigation.19
Further, Congress provides the SEC with broad powers to enforce federal securities laws in court.20 Whenever the SEC determines that someone
is in violation, the Commission can seek an injunction against such actions.21 The SEC can also bring an action for civil money penalties22 in
federal court against alleged violators.23 Under this statutory scheme and
the broad equitable powers of the federal courts, the SEC can bring a variety of injunctive and ancillary remedies to enforce federal securities laws.24
Beside injunctions, a form of ancillary or non-injunctive relief the SEC
can seek in federal district courts is the disgorgement of illegally obtained
profits.25 Federal courts describe disgorgement as “a method of forcing a
defendant to give up the amount by which he was unjustly enriched.”26
Upon a showing of federal securities law violations, a federal court may order the disgorgement of a reasonable estimation of the defendant’s illegally
obtained profits.27 The court must separate the defendant’s illegally and legally obtained profits when calculating the disgorgement amount,28 and
“because of the difficulty of determining with certainty the extent to which
a defendant’s gains resulted from his frauds—especially profits from transactions in securities whose market price has been affected by the frauds—

17. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881, 881 (1934) (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp (2012)).
18. Those who receive a subpoena from the SEC are not subject to penalties for refusing to
obey, but the Commission may enforce compliance with the investigation in federal court. SEC v.
Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 741 (1984) (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 77v(b), 78u(c) (2012)).
19. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 77s(b), 78u(a), (b) (2012)).
20. SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 1984).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (2012) (“Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any person
is engaged or about to engage in any acts or practices which constitute or will constitute a violation of the [securities laws] . . . the Commission may, in its discretion, bring an action in any district court of the United States . . . to enjoin such acts or practices, and upon a proper showing, a
permanent or temporary injunction . . . .”).
22. A civil money penalty is used to punish a defendant “for violating a public law” and goes
farther than just compensating the victim for their loss. SEC v. Kokesh, No. 09-cv-1021, 2015
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179999, at *21 (D.N.M. Mar. 30, 2015) (quoting United States v. Telluride Co.,
146 F.3d 1241, 1246 (10th Cir. 1998)).
23. 15 U.S.C. § 77t(d)(1) (2012).
24. Materia, 745 F.2d at 200–01.
25. Id. at 201.
26. SEC v. Razmilovic, 738 F.3d 14, 31 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting SEC v. Commonwealth
Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 102 (2d Cir. 1978)).
27. Id. (quoting SEC v. First Jersey Sec., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1475 (2d Cir. 1996)).
28. Id. (quoting CFTC v. British Am. Commodity Options Corp., 788 F.2d 92, 93 (2d Cir.
1986)).
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the court need not determine the amount of such gains with exactitude.”29
The SEC has sought disgorgement for a variety of securities law violations,
such as pump-and-dump schemes,30 Ponzi schemes,31 and misappropriations of funds from investors.32 While federal courts view disgorgement as
part of their equitable powers,33 Congress has only given the SEC express
statutory authority to seek disgorgement in administrative proceedings.34
Federal courts, however, have authorized the SEC to seek any form of ancillary relief, including disgorgement, “where necessary and proper to effectuate the purposes of [a] statutory scheme.”35
B. The Statute of Limitations and the Supreme Court’s Interpretation
of “Penalty”
Under the statute of limitations, any “action, suit or proceeding for the
enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise,
shall not be entertained unless commenced within five years from the date
when the claim first accrued.”36 While applicable to securities law enforcement, this statute is broad in scope and applies to a variety of penalty
provisions37 in the United States Code.38 This statute is considered a
“catch-all statute of limitations in situations where Congress did not specifically include a time limitation in [a] statute.”39 Under the statute, “a claim

29. Id.
30. See, e.g., SEC v. World Info. Tech., Inc., 590 F. Supp. 2d 574–75, 577–78 (S.D.N.Y.
2008) (ordering the disgorgement of profits gained through a “pump-and-dump” scheme to create
artificial demand in stock before sale at an inflated price).
31. See, e.g., SEC v. McGinn, Smith & Co., 98 F. Supp. 3d 506, 521–24 (N.D.N.Y. 2015)
(ordering the disgorgement of assets arising out of a Ponzi scheme from a stock account jointly
owned by an investment adviser and his wife).
32. See, e.g., SEC v. Loomis, 17 F. Supp. 3d 1026, 1030–32 (E.D. Cal. 2014) (ordering the
disgorgement of both the funds which the owner of an investment planning company received for
the purchase of unregistered securities and the interest avoided when he used those funds to take
out loans).
33. See SEC v. Razmilovic, 738 F.3d 14, 31 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting SEC v. First Jersey Sec.,
Inc., 101 F.3d 1450, 1474 (2d Cir. 1996)).
34. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-2(e) (2012) (“In any proceeding in which the Commission or the
appropriate regulatory agency may impose a penalty under this section, the Commission or the
appropriate regulatory agency may enter an order requiring accounting and disgorgement, including reasonable interest.”).
35. SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 1984) (citing SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co.,
446 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d Cir. 1971)).
36. 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (2012).
37. Other enforcement actions this statute applies to include those under the Clean Air Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2012), New Jersey v. RRI Energy Mid-Atlantic Power Holdings, LLC,
960 F. Supp. 2d 512, 523 (E.D. Pa. 2013), and the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C
§§ 41–58 (2012), United States v. Ancorp Nat’l Servs., Inc., 516 F.2d 198, 200 n.5 (2d Cir. 1975).
38. Gabelli v. SEC, 568 U.S. 442, 454 (2013) (holding that civil penalty actions brought by
the SEC must be brought within five years of the date the wrongdoing occurred under § 2462).
39. FEC v. Nat’l Republican Senatorial Comm., 877 F. Supp. 15, 17 (D.D.C. 1995).
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accrues ‘when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action’”40
and not when the plaintiff has “discovered” the cause of action.41 Under
this statute, potential defendants are only subject to penalty enforcement actions for an exact number of years, instead of an indeterminate amount of
years.42 Potential defendants, therefore, may cease to fear defending against
a penalty action five years after their wrongdoing, regardless of what the
government knows at that point in time.43 The start of the statute of limitations may be delayed until the wrong is discovered for some plaintiffs,44 but
this exception has never been extended to the government bringing enforcement actions.45 Therefore, with few exceptions,46 government agencies such as the SEC, whose purpose is to discover securities fraud and
which possesses the tools to do so,47 must bring a civil enforcement action
within five years of date of the wrongdoing.48
Under the statute of limitations, the government must bring an enforcement action for penalties “within five years from the date when the
claim first accrued.”49 Section 2462, however, does not provide a definition
of “penalty” in its text.50 The Supreme Court has stepped in to define penalty in several of its past cases. In Huntington v. Attrill,51 the Court defined
a penalty as an action that “denote[s] punishment, whether corporal or pecuniary, imposed and enforced by the State, for a crime or offense against

40. Gabelli, 568 U.S. at 448 (quoting Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007)).
41. Id. at 449 (quoting Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633, 644 (2010)).
42. See id. at 452 (“Yet grafting the discovery rule onto § 2462 would raise similar concerns.
It would leave defendants exposed to Government enforcement action not only for five years after
their misdeeds, but for an additional uncertain period into the future.”).
43. Id. (citing Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 554 (2000)).
44. This principle is called the “discovery rule.” Id. at 449. The discovery rule is used to
allow defrauded “victims who do not know they are injured and who reasonably do not inquire as
to any injury” to delay the running of the statute of limitations until they discover the injury. Id. at
450–51. This rule applies to private parties unaware of their injuries and not government enforcement authorities. See id. (explaining the “good reasons why the fraud discovery rule has not
been extended to Government enforcement actions for civil penalties” but has been extended to
private parties).
45. Id. at 449.
46. Under the fraudulent concealment doctrine, a plaintiff may,
toll the statute [of limitations] if the plaintiff alleges: (1) that the defendants concealed
the cause of action; (2) that the plaintiff did not discover the cause of action until some
point within five years of commencing the action; and (3) that the plaintiff’s continuing
ignorance was not attributable to lack of diligence on its part.
SEC v. Power, 525 F. Supp. 2d 415, 424 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (citing SEC v. Jones, No. 05 Civ. 7044
(RCC), 2006 WL 1084276, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2006)).
47. Gabelli, 568 U.S. at 451.
48. Id. at 454.
49. 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (2012).
50. Id.
51. 146 U.S. 657 (1892).
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its laws”52 and described the term as “elastic in meaning.”53 The Court
found that a remedy that was brought for the purpose of punishing and deterring others from committing the same act constituted a penalty,54 while a
remedy that merely gives compensatory damages to an injured party was
not a penalty.55 Based on these definitions, the Court held that the test to
determine whether a remedy qualified as a penalty was “whether the wrong
sought to be redressed is a wrong to the public,” and therefore penal, “or a
wrong to the individual,” and therefore nonpunitive.56
A few years after the Huntington decision, the Court applied the test
from that case to a copyright infringement statute57 in Brady v. Daly.58 In
the case, Daly sued Brady for copyright infringement in federal circuit court
and sought damages for the infringement under Section 4966 of the Revised
Statutes.59 Brady asserted that the damages60 sought by Daly under Section
4966 constituted a penalty, which federal district courts had exclusive jurisdiction over and, therefore, that the circuit court61 that heard the case had no
jurisdiction over it.62 The Court noted that the statute did not mention the
word penalty or forfeiture and only provided for damages that directly resulted from the copyright infringement.63 The Court further noted, “The
“whole recovery [was] given to the proprietor, and the statute d[id] not provide for a recovery by any other person in case the proprietor himself neglects to sue.”64 Therefore, because the statute gave only the victim of copyright infringement, and not the public, a right to damages, the Court found
that the recovery awarded was not a penalty.65
52. Id. at 667 (citing United States v. Reisinger, 128 U.S. 398, 402 (1888); and then citing
United States v. Chouteau, 102 U.S. 603, 611 (1880)).
53. Id. The Court noted the term’s elastic meaning allows it “even to be familiarly applied to
cases of private contracts, wholly independent of statutes.” Id.
54. Id. at 668 (quoting Reed v. Inhabitants of Northfield, 30 Mass. (13 Pick.) 94, 100–01
(1832)).
55. Id. at 667–68 (quoting Read v. Inhabitants of Chelmsford, 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 128, 132
(1834)).
56. Id. at 668.
57. REV. STAT. § 4966 (1875).
58. 175 U.S. 148, 155–57 (1899) (quoting Huntington, 146 U.S. at 667).
59. Id. at 150–51.
60. Under the statute, those who infringe on a copyright “shall be liable for damages . . . not
less than one hundred dollars for the first, and fifty dollars for every subsequent performance.”
§ 4966.
61. Federal circuit courts at the time had jurisdiction over “all suits at law or in equity arising
under the patent or copyright laws of the United States.” Daly, 175 U.S. at 153 (quoting REV.
STAT. § 629(9) (1875)).
62. Id. at 152.
63. Id. at 154 (“The person wrongfully performing or representing a dramatic composition is,
in the words of the statute, ‘liable for damages therefor[e].’ This means all the damages, that are
the direct result of his wrongful act.”).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 156.
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The Supreme Court later applied the Huntington test to a statute of
limitations66 similar67 to Section 2462 in Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R.R.68 In
district court, Lehigh Valley Railroad Company was ordered to pay damages for illegal rates it charged to Meeker’s coal trading firm.69 Lehigh Valley, however, argued that the then-current statute of limitations barred
Meeker’s claims.70 Comparable to Section 2462, the disputed statute of
limitations “place[d] a limitation of five years upon any ‘suit or prosecution
for any penalty or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise, accruing under the
laws of the United States.’”71 The Court found that “penalty” in the statute
referred to remedies imposed for punitive reasons and not for redressing
private injuries, so the statute of limitations did not apply to the reparation
damages awarded to Meeker, even though Lehigh Valley’s actions violated
public law.72 Recent Supreme Court cases have echoed the sentiments of
Huntington, Brady, and Meeker and found that penalties are remedies that
typically “go beyond compensation”73 and “intend[] to punish culpable individuals.”74
Prior to Kokesh, several United States courts of appeals considered
whether Section 2462 applied to disgorgement.75 Along with the Tenth
Circuit,76 the majority of circuit courts held that the remedy was an equitable remedy and not a penalty, including the D.C.,77 First,78 and Ninth79 Cir66. REV. STAT. § 1047 (1914).
67. This statute of limitations has been called the predecessor of 28 U.S.C. § 2462. Johnson
v. SEC, 87 F.3d 484, 487 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
68. 236 U.S. 412, 423 (1915).
69. Id. at 422.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 423 (quoting REV. STAT. § 1047 (1914)).
72. Id. The Court found that “the liability sought to be enforced [against Lehigh Valley] was
not punitive but strictly remedial.” Id. (quoting REV. STAT. § 1047 (1914)).
73. Gabelli v. SEC, 568 U.S. 442, 451–52 (2013) (“[P]enalties, which go beyond compensation, are intended to punish, and label defendants wrongdoers.” (citing Meeker, 236 U.S. at 423)).
74. Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 422 (1987) (“A civil penalty was a type of remedy at
common law that could only be enforced in courts of law. Remedies intended to punish culpable
individuals, as opposed to those intended simply to extract compensation or restore the status quo,
were issued by courts of law, not courts of equity.”).
75. See, e.g., Zacharias v. SEC, 569 F.3d 458, 471 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (considering whether the
SEC’s “order requiring [defendants] to disgorge all profits (plus prejudgment interest) from their
illegal transactions impose[d] a civil penalty”); SEC v. Tambone, 550 F.3d 106, 148 (1st Cir.
2008) (determining whether § 2462 applies to “disgorgement of ill-gotten gains”); SEC v. Graham, 823 F.3d 1357, 1363 (11th Cir. 2016) (considering whether “§ 2462’s statute of limitations
applies to disgorgement”).
76. See United States v. Telluride Co., 146 F.3d 1241, 1247 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that
disgorgement was not a penalty under the statute of limitations because of its remedial nature); see
infra text accompanying notes 117–118.
77. See Zacharias, 569 F.3d at 471 (holding the disgorgement of the defendants’ illegal profits was not a civil penalty subject to § 2462).
78. See Tambone, 550 F.3d at 148 (holding that § 2462 only applied to “penalties sought by
the SEC” and not disgorgement or injunctions).
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cuits. In fact, the only court of appeals that held the statute of limitations
applied to disgorgement was the Eleventh Circuit in SEC v. Graham.80
However, the Eleventh Circuit found that disgorgement was functionally
synonymous with “forfeiture,” another remedy subject to Section 2462.81
Therefore, while this holding created a circuit split regarding the applicability of Section 2462 to disgorgement,82 no court of appeals held that disgorgement was a penalty under the statute of limitations before the Supreme
Court decided Kokesh.83
C. Lower Court Decisions in Kokesh v. SEC
Charles Kokesh owned and operated two investment adviser firms
(“Advisers”), which gave investment advice to several business development companies84 (“Funds”).85 Each of the Advisers had compensation
contracts with the Funds signed by Mr. Kokesh, which prohibited payments
to the Advisers not enumerated in the agreements.86 On October 27, 2009,
the SEC filed a complaint against Mr. Kokesh, alleging that from 1995 to
2007, he misappropriated nearly $35 million from the Funds; filed “false
and misleading SEC reports and proxy statements” to hide the misappropriations; and executed contracts with “illegal performance-fee provisions.”87
After a five-day trial during early November 2014, the jury found against
Mr. Kokesh on all claims.88
The jury found that Mr. Kokesh directed the Advisers’ treasurer to
withdraw $23.8 million from the Funds to compensate the Advisers’ employees and $5 million to pay for rent.89 Mr. Kokesh also directed his firms
to take $6.1 million from the Funds that were described as “tax distribu79. See SEC v. Rind, 991 F.2d 1486, 1493 (9th Cir. 1993) (“[A]ctions for disgorgement of
improper profits are equitable in nature.”).
80. 823 F.3d 1357, 1363 (11th Cir. 2016).
81. Id. The Eleventh Circuit noted that because it held that disgorgement was considered
forfeiture under § 2462, the court did not need to “reach the defendants’ alternative argument that”
the remedy was a penalty. Id. at 1363 n.3.
82. Compare Zacharias, 569 F.3d at 471 (holding the disgorgement of the defendants’ illegal
profits was not a civil penalty subject to § 2462), with Graham, 823 F.3d at 1363 (finding no significant difference between forfeiture and disgorgement and, therefore, disgorgement is subject to
§ 2462).
83. 137 S. Ct. 1635 (2017).
84. These companies “raised money from investors through public securities offerings and
invested in private start-up companies that focused on technology, biotechnology, and medical
diagnostics.” SEC v. Kokesh, 834 F.3d 1158, 1161 (10th Cir. 2016), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 1635
(2017).
85. SEC v. Kokesh, No. 09-cv-1021, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179999, at *1–2 (D.N.M Mar.
30, 2015), aff’d, 834 F.3d 1158 (10th Cir. 2016), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 1635 (2017).
86. Kokesh, 834 F.3d at 1161.
87. Kokesh, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179999, at *2.
88. Id.
89. Kokesh, 834 F.3d at 1161.
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tions”90 in the SEC reports he signed, although he only paid approximately
$10,000 in federal taxes that year.91 All of these payments were either not
explicitly permitted under the contract or expressly prohibited by the contracts’ language and, therefore, in violation of the agreements.92 Though
the agreements were amended at one point to allow for reimbursement for
controlling-person salaries, Mr. Kokesh misrepresented himself as the only
controlling-person and reported a much smaller salary than he had received93 in a proxy statement.94 Mr. Kokesh was found in “direct violation”
of Section 37 of the Investment Company Act of 194095 for “‘knowingly
and willfully’ convert[ing] investment-company assets to his own use or to
the use of another”96 and was also found to have aided and abetted violations of several federal securities laws97 for “‘knowingly and substantially
assisting” the Advisers” to engage in securities fraud.98
After the rendering of the verdict, the SEC sought entry of final judgment ordering Mr. Kokesh “(1) to pay a civil money penalty, (2) to be permanently enjoined from violating . . . federal securities laws, and (3) to disgorge” money misappropriated during the various violations.99 However,
because some of the claims brought by the SEC accrued outside of the fiveyear statute of limitations period,100 the district court could not order civil
money penalties101 for those specific claims.102 Under the statute, “any civil
fine, penalty, or forfeiture” cannot be ordered five years after a civil action
is brought.103 The district court, however, found that neither an injunction
90. Mr. Kokesh received ninety percent of these distributions. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Mr. Kokesh reported an average salary of $221,000 from 1998 to 2000, while the accurate figure was $771,000. SEC v. Kokesh, No. 09-cv-1021, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179999, at *3
(D.N.M Mar. 30, 2015), aff’d, 834 F.3d 1158 (10th Cir. 2016), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 1635 (2017).
94. Kokesh, 834 F.3d at 1161.
95. Investment Company Act of 1940 § 37, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-36 (2012).
96. Kokesh, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179999, at *2.
97. The provisions included § 205 of the Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5 (2012); §§ 206(1)
and 206(2) of the Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-6(1)–(2) (2012); §§ 13(a) and 14(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78n (2012); Exchange Act Rules 12b-20, 13a-1, 13a-13, and 14a9, 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.12b-20, 13a-1, 13a-13, 14a-9 (2017); § 209(f) of the Investment Advisers Act
of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9(f) (2012); and § 20(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2012). Kokesh, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179999, at *5.
98. Id. at *4–5.
99. Id. at *6.
100. Claims against Mr. Kokesh that accrued on or before October 26, 2004 were not subject
to civil penalties. Id. at *8.
101. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
102. Kokesh, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179999, at *7–8.
103. 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (2012) (“Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, an action,
suit or proceeding for the enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise, shall not be entertained unless commenced within five years from the date when the claim
first accrued . . . .”).
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nor disgorgement serve as a penalty and were, therefore, not subject to the
statute of limitations.104 The district court found that an injunction was not
a penalty “because it does not seek compensation unrelated to or in excess
of the damage caused by Defendant . . . [and] is precisely tailored to Defendant’s wrongs.”105 The district court further reasoned that disgorgement
was not a penalty either because ordering Mr. Kokesh to hand over his profits that resulted from his wrongful actions was “quintessentially equitable.”106 Therefore, the District Court ordered an injunction107 and disgorgement of $34,927,329 against Mr. Kokesh, along with a civil penalty of
$2,354,593108 for claims accrued within the limitations period.109 Mr.
Kokesh appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit on the grounds that the injunction and disgorgement orders were prohibited under the statute of limitations.110
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s injunction and disgorgement orders.111 The court first considered whether an injunction is a penalty.112 Noting “everyone has a duty to obey the law,” the Tenth Circuit
found no reason to deem an injunction as a penalty.113 The purpose of the
injunction was to protect the public from further violations by incentivizing114 Mr. Kokesh not to break any more laws.115 The Tenth Circuit then
considered whether disgorgement was a penalty or forfeiture under Section
2462.116 In United States v. Telluride Co.,117 the Tenth Circuit already held
that disgorgement was not a penalty under the statute of limitations because
of its remedial nature.118 The Tenth Circuit found that the purpose of disgorgement was not to inflict punishment on the defendant but to eliminate
profits reaped from the illegal activities.119 The court noted that the remedy
only “leaves the wrongdoer ‘in the position he would have occupied had
104. Kokesh, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179999, at *32.
105. Id. at *21–22 (citing United States v. Telluride Co., 146 F.3d 1241, 1246 (10th Cir.
1998)).
106. Id. at *29–30.
107. Mr. Kokesh was enjoined from committing any future violations of securities laws. Id. at
*7.
108. The district court set the appropriate amount of the civil money penalty as the amount of
funds Mr. Kokesh received during the limitations period. Id. at *15.
109. Id. at *31–32.
110. SEC v. Kokesh, 834 F.3d 1158, 1161 (10th Cir. 2016), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 1635 (2017).
111. Id. at 1160.
112. Id. at 1162.
113. Id.
114. If Mr. Kokesh violated the injunction, he would be held in contempt of court. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1164.
117. 146 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir. 1998).
118. Kokesh, 834 F.3d at 1164 (citing Telluride, 146 F.3d at 1247).
119. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51(4)
(AM. LAW INST. 2010)).
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there been no misconduct.’”120 Therefore, while the Tenth Circuit ordered
Mr. Kokesh to disgorge more than just the funds that he kept,121 the court
found that it was not a penalty to order a wrongdoer to pay back all of the
funds misappropriated by him, regardless of who received the money.122
While disgorgement-style remedies were recently added to some federal
forfeiture statutes,123 the Tenth Circuit noted that such expansion in government power began decades after Section 2462 was passed.124 Consequently, because courts interpret statutory language as Congress would
have understood it at the time of passage,125 the Tenth Circuit found that
disgorgement was not a type of “forfeiture” under Section 2462.126 Mr.
Kokesh appealed the Tenth Circuit’s decision, and the Supreme Court of
the United States then granted certiorari to hear the case.127
D. The Supreme Court’s Reasoning in Kokesh v. SEC
In Kokesh v. SEC, the Supreme Court of the United States reversed the
Tenth Circuit’s conclusion that disgorgement was not a penalty under 28
U.S.C. § 2462.128 The Court unanimously held that disgorgement for securities enforcement was a penalty under the statute of limitations and, therefore, must be brought within five years of the date that the claim ripened.129
The Court defined a penalty as “a punishment, whether corporal or pecuniary, imposed and enforced by the State, for a crime or offen[s]e against its
laws,”130 which evoked two principles used to construe the meaning of penalty.131 First, the Court analyzed “whether the wrong sought to be redressed
is a wrong to the public, or a wrong to the individual.”132 Second, the Court
examined whether the remedy “is sought ‘for the purpose of punishment,
and to deter others from offending in like manner’—as opposed to compensating a victim for his loss.”133 In applying these principles, the Court
found that disgorgement is a penalty for three reasons: (1) disgorgement
120. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 51
cmt. k (AM. LAW INST. 2010)).
121. Some of the money Mr. Kokesh misappropriated went to other people. Id.
122. Id. at 1164–65 (citing SEC v. Contorinis, 743 F.3d 296, 307 (2d Cir. 2014)).
123. Id. at 1166 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(3) (2012)). The statute of limitations applies to
civil forfeitures. 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (2012).
124. Kokesh, 834 F.3d at 1166. The statute of limitations was codified in 1948. Id.
125. Id. (quoting Hackwell v. United States, 491 F.3d 1229, 1236 (10th Cir. 2007)).
126. Id.
127. Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1641 (2017).
128. Id. at 1645.
129. Id. at 1639, 1645.
130. Id. at 1642 (alteration in original) (quoting Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 667
(1892)).
131. Id.
132. Id. (quoting Huntington, 146 U.S. at 668).
133. Id. (quoting Huntington, 146 U.S. at 668).
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serves as a repercussion for violating public laws;134 (2) it is used punitively
to deter violations of public laws;135 and (3) the remedy does not serve a
compensatory purpose.136
The Court began by examining the history and purpose of the Commission.137 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 created an agency with
the power “to prescribe ‘rules and regulations . . . as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors’”138 and the power
to investigate potential violations of securities laws.139 The agency is able
to bring enforcement claims in federal court if evidence of a securities violation is discovered.140 Though at first the only remedy the SEC could
bring was an injunction,141 courts began to order disgorgements in the
1970s “to ‘deprive . . . defendants of their profits in order to remove any
monetary reward for violating’ securities laws and to ‘protect the investing
public by providing an effective deterrent to future violations.’”142 Congress further permitted the SEC to seek monetary civil penalties143 in the
1990s.144 With a variety of effective tools and remedies available to enforce
federal securities laws, the Court noted that the SEC still pursues disgorgement in its enforcement actions.145
The Court then used two principles to interpret the term “penalty” in
the context of the statute of limitations.146 The first principle analyzed
whether the sanction is used to remedy a wrong to a person or to the public.147 The second principle considered whether the remedy is used to deter
future violations and punishment or to recompense a victim for their loss.148
134. Id. at 1643.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1644.
137. Id. at 1639–40.
138. Id. at 1640 (alteration in original) (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. 723, 728 (1975)).
139. Id. (quoting SEC v. Jerry T. O’Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 741 (1984)).
140. Id.
141. Id. (citing 1 T. HAZEN, LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 1:37 (7th ed., rev. 2016)).
142. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. 77, 92
(S.D.N.Y. 1970)).
143. The law permits the Commission to impose a civil penalty to be paid by the defendant,
and the size of the penalty is determined by the egregiousness of the wrongful act. 15 U.S.C.
§ 77t(d) (2012).
144. Kokesh, 137 S. Ct. at 1640. This remedy was authorized as part of the Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act. Id. (citing Securities Enforcement and Penny
Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-429, 104 Stat. 932 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77t(d)
(2012))).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1642.
147. Id. (quoting Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 667 (1892)); see supra text accompanying note 132.
148. Kokesh, 137 S. Ct. at 1642 (quoting Huntington, 146 U.S. at 667); see supra text accompanying note 133.
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The Court previously used these principles to construe the meaning of penalty for other statutes of limitations149 and the statutory predecessor150 of
Section 2462.151 The Court held that a remedy that provides compensation
for a private wrong is not a penalty,152 while a remedy that is “imposed in a
punitive way for an infraction of a public law” is a penalty.153
In applying these two principles to disgorgement, the Court held that
the remedy is a penalty under the statute of limitations.154 First, the Court
argued that disgorgement sought by the SEC was ordered for a violation of
a public law.155 When such a remedy is sought, the Court noted it was ordered for a violation committed against the United States and may ensue
regardless of the victim’s support of or participation in the civil action.156
Second, the remedy is used for punitive purposes.157 Since the SEC began
to seek disgorgement “courts have consistently held that ‘[t]he primary purpose of disgorgement orders is to deter violations of the securities laws by
depriving violators of their ill-gotten gains.’”158 The Court observed that
civil remedies used to deter violations of the law are intrinsically punitive.159 Third, the Court found the disgorgement brought by the SEC was
often not compensatory.160 When the remedy is ordered, the ill-gotten gains
are paid to the district court, and it is up to that court to decide how the
money will be allocated.161 Though the disgorged profits may go to the victims of the violation, the courts are not obligated by statute to give any of
the money to them.162
In response to the SEC’s claim that disgorgement was not punitive and
merely returned the defendant to the place he was in prior to the violation,
the Court noted that the remedy sometimes left the defendant worse off than
before.163 For example, someone who engaged in insider trading may have
to pay back both their own profits and the gains of third parties that benefit-

149.
150.
151.
(1915)).
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
1997)).
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Kokesh, 137 S. Ct. at 1642 (quoting Brady v. Daly, 175 U.S. 148, 153–54 (1899)).
REV. STAT. § 1047 (1913); see supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text.
Kokesh, 137 S. Ct. at 1642 (citing Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 236 U.S. 412, 421–22
Id. (citing Daly, 175 U.S. at 154).
Id. at 1643 (quoting Meeker, 236 U.S. at 423).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting SEC v. Fischbach Corp., 133 F.3d 170, 175 (2d Cir.
Id. (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 n.20 (1979)).
Id. at 1644.
Id. (quoting Fischbach Corp., 133 F.3d at 175).
Id.
Id. at 1644–45.
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ted from their wrongful conduct.164 In this case, Mr. Kokesh’s business expenses that reduced his overall profit were not considered when calculating
the disgorgement.165 The Court noted that, although disgorgement could
serve a compensatory goal, a civil remedy that also served a retributive or
deterrent purpose was punishment.166 Accordingly, the Court concluded
that disgorgement serves as a penalty under the statute of limitations and
reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.167
II. ANALYSIS
In Kokesh v. SEC, the Supreme Court of the United States held that
disgorgement in securities enforcement operates as a penalty under the statute of limitations and must be brought within five years of the date the
claim accrued.168 This Part will first discuss that the Court made the correct
judgment in this case because the SEC used disgorgement to punish defendants and not to compensate victims.169 This Part will then highlight the
significant implications of Kokesh’s holding for the Commission, which
now has a limited time frame to seek disgorgement and, consequently, less
settlement leverage.170 Finally, this Part will discuss the heightened costs
potentially facing defendants subject to disgorgement since disgorged profits likely will not be tax deductible or covered by most insurance policies.171
A. The Supreme Court Correctly Determined That the SEC Uses
Disgorgement to Punish Defendants for the Violation of Federal
Securities Laws
In applying the first principle from Huntington v. Attrill to determine
whether a civil remedy is a penalty, the Court rightfully found that the SEC
uses disgorgement in enforcement actions to remedy a wrong to the public.172 The first Huntington principle considers whether the remedy is utilized to redress a wrong to an individual or a wrong to the public.173 When
requesting disgorgement, the SEC seeks to remedy a wrong against the
United States, and not an individual person, which is why the SEC may enforce federal securities laws violations in court without the consent of the

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id. at 1644 (quoting SEC v. Contorinis, 743 F.3d 296, 302 (2d Cir. 2014)).
Id.
Id. at 1645 (quoting Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 610 (1993)).
Id.
Id. at 1639.
See infra Part II.A–B.
See infra Part II.C.1.
See infra Part II.C.2.
Kokesh, 137 S. Ct. at 1643.
Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 668 (1892); see supra text accompanying note 132.
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victim of the wrongdoing.174 The Commission has long taken the position
that its “primary function is to protect the public from fraudulent and other
unlawful practices and not to obtain damages for injured individuals.”175
The SEC continued to recognize this function in its brief for Kokesh.176
Further, the SEC uses disgorgement to discourage others from committing federal securities laws violations.177 The Supreme Court has noted
that remedies imposed for the purpose of deterring violations of laws are
punitive.178 The Commission has long said that, even in cases where the
Commission asked for disgorged profits to be paid to those harmed, it solely acted to deter others from committing securities violations.179 In fact, the
SEC’s policy for enforcement proceedings is to target violations predominantly “based on the message that will be sent to the public and to the industry about the reach of its enforcement actions and the amount of investor
harm.”180 In its role as a law enforcement agency, the SEC has stated that it
seeks disgorgement because injunctions against future violations alone cannot provide effective deterrence.181 Federal courts have also held that the
primary purpose of the civil remedy is deterrence182 and that effective SEC
deterrence is dependent on the disgorgement remedy.183 Therefore, the
SEC uses disgorgement to vindicate the public interest while enforcing federal securities laws.

174. Kokesh, 137 S. Ct. at 1643.
175. 41 SEC ANN. REP. 97–98 (1975).
176. Brief for Respondent at 22, Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635 (2017) (No. 16-529) (“When
the SEC seeks disgorgement, it acts in the public interest, to remedy harm to the public at large,
rather than standing in the shoes of particular injured parties.”).
177. Kokesh, 137 S. Ct. at 1643.
178. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 n.20 (1979) (citing Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez,
372 U.S. 144, 168 (1963)).
179. See Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 483 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), rev’d on other grounds,
438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1970) (“While in rare cases, as an adjunct to injunctive relief, the Commission has urged a court to deprive violators of their illegal gains by directing that these be paid to
individuals who have been injured by their violations, even in such cases the Commission does not
seek to make investors whole; it seeks merely to deter violators by making violations unprofitable.”).
180. James D. Cox et al., SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An Empirical Inquiry, 53 DUKE L. J.
737, 763 (2003).
181. Dolgow, 43 F.R.D. at 483.
182. See, e.g., SEC v. Fischbach Corp., 133 F.3d 170, 175 (2d Cir. 1997) (“The primary purpose of disgorgement orders is to deter violations of the securities laws by depriving violators of
their ill-gotten gains.”); SEC v. Rind, 991 F.2d 1486, 1490 (9th Cir. 1993) (“The theory behind
[disgorgement] is deterrence and not compensation.”).
183. See SEC v. Manor Nursing Ctrs., Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1104 (2d Cir. 1972) (“The deterrent effect of an SEC enforcement action would be greatly undermined if securities law violators
were not required to disgorge illicit profits.”); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301,
1308 (2d Cir. 1971) (“It would severely defeat the purposes of the [Securities Exchange Act of
1934] if a violator of Rule 10b-5 were allowed to retain the profits from his violation.”).
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B. Strictly Punitive—The Court Properly Held the SEC Does Not
Utilize Disgorgement to Compensate Victims or Remedy a Wrong
The Court correctly found that the SEC’s use of disgorgement in securities law enforcement does not compensate the victim for their loss or only
extract the defendant’s ill-gotten gains when applying the second Huntington principle.184 The second Huntington principle determines whether the
remedy is sought to compensate a victim for their losses or to punish the defendant.185 The SEC argued in Kokesh that disgorgement orders are often
compensatory and, therefore, “unambiguously nonpunitive.”186 However,
federal courts have decided “[t]he primary purpose of disgorgement [was]
not to refund others for losses suffered but rather ‘to deprive the wrongdoer
of his ill-gotten gain.’”187 This is evinced by the fact that, if the SEC successfully seeks a disgorgement order, the disgorged profits are paid to the
federal district court and not directly to the aggrieved individual.188 Even
though a district court may choose to give the disgorged funds to the victim
of the violation, it has no legal obligation to do so.189 Funds have been distributed to other recipients, such as the United States Treasury.190 In fact,
from 1998 to 2002, 35 out of 87 SEC enforcement actions that successfully
sought disgorgement either distributed the funds to the U.S. Treasury or had
made no payment at all.191 In fiscal year 2015, the SEC successfully obtained over $4 billion from disgorgement and civil penalties, but only $158
million was distributed to defrauded investors.192 In enforcement actions,
the SEC focuses primarily on extracting profits from those who violated securities laws and less on what happens to those funds.193 For example, from
1987 to 1994, the agency collected data on the application of disgorgement
184. Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1644 (2017).
185. Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 668 (1892); see supra text accompanying note 133.
186. Brief for Respondent at 10, Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635 (2017) (No. 16-529).
187. SEC v. Bilzerian, 29 F.3d 689, 697 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (quoting SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d
1325, 1335 (5th Cir. 1978)).
188. See SEC v. Fischbach Corp., 133 F.3d 170, 175 (2d Cir. 1997) (“Once the profits have
been disgorged, it remains within the court’s discretion to determine how and to whom the money
will be distributed . . . .”).
189. Kokesh, 137 S. Ct. at 1644.
190. Fischbach Corp., 133 F.3d at 171.
191. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT PURSUANT TO SECTION 308(C) OF THE
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002, at 5, 10 (2003). Thirty-eight of those actions paid defrauded
investors either directly or through alternative methods and the remaining cases were expected to
pay those harmed by the fraud, though no payments had been made yet. Id. at 10–11.
192. Jonathan N. Eisenberg, 13 Observations about the SEC’s Enforcement Program, HARV.
L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Apr. 18, 2016),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/04/18/13-observations-about-the-secs-enforcementprogram/. This is the lowest amount of disgorged funds the SEC has distributed to investors since
the Commission started disclosing this information in fiscal year 2012. Id.
193. Barbara Black, Should the SEC Be a Collection Agency for Defrauded Investors?, 63
BUS. LAW. 317, 321 (2008).
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orders against defendants, but the agency kept no information on how much
money was disgorged or where it was distributed.194
Further, the Court correctly held that disgorgement often does not return the defendant back to the place they would have been if the violation
had never occurred.195 The SEC argued that disgorgement was not a penalty because it merely restored the status quo and lessened the harm done by
the defendant’s wrongdoing.196 Disgorgement, however, can exceed the defendant’s total profits gained from the securities law violation.197 For example, a defendant that engaged in insider trading may have to disgorge
both their own profits and the profits of third parties that resulted from the
defendant’s wrongdoing.198 A defendant subject to disgorgement could be
held jointly and severally liable for the profits of someone else that engaged
in the same wrongdoing.199 In Mr. Kokesh’s case, the amount the SEC disgorged did not consider his overall business expenses that reduced his overall profit.200 Further, the Commission and federal courts “generally say that
disgorgement can be ordered even against defendants who no longer possess or have access to the tainted profits, or never possessed them at all.”201
The SEC, however, does grant disgorgement waivers to defendants that
cannot pay the disgorgement order, though both the SEC and a court must
approve the waiver.202 Though disgorgement may serve a compensatory
purpose, the Supreme Court has previously held that civil penalties can

194. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-94-188, SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT:
IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN SEC CONTROLS OVER DISGORGEMENT CASES 3 (1994).
195. Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1644 (2017).
196. Brief for Respondent at 17, Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635 (2017) (No. 16-529) (quoting SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1978)).
197. Kokesh, 137 S. Ct. at 1644.
198. See SEC v. Contorinis, 743 F.3d 296, 302 (2d Cir. 2014) (discussing tipper-tippee context).
199. Russell G. Ryan, The Equity Façade of SEC Disgorgement, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV.
ONLINE 1, 7 (2013), http://www.hblr.org/2013/11/the-equity-facade-of-sec-disgorgement/.
200. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 22–23, Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635 (2017) (No. 16529) (“[T]he amount that [Kokesh] has been ordered to disgorge far exceeds any amount that
[Kokesh] ever received, and instead reflects payments to separate corporations, unrelated officers
of those corporations, and even landlords.”).
201. Ryan, supra note 199, at 5; see, e.g., SEC v. Whittemore, 659 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(quoting SEC v. Banner Fund Int’l, 211 F.3d 602, 617 (D.C. Cir. 2000)) (explaining that “a disgorgement order pertains to ‘a sum equal to the amount wrongfully obtained, rather than a requirement to replevy a specific asset,’ and ‘establishes a personal liability, which the defendant
must satisfy regardless [of] whether he retains the selfsame proceeds of his wrongdoing’” (alteration in original)).
202. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-02-771, SEC ENFORCEMENT: MORE ACTIONS
NEEDED TO IMPROVE OVERSIGHT OF DISGORGEMENT COLLECTIONS 6, 25 (2002),
https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02771.pdf.
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serve many purposes, and a civil action that does not serve a strictly remedial purpose, but also a deterrent purpose, is punishment.203
C. Higher Stakes—The SEC’s New Time Crunch and Potential
Increased Costs for Defendants
While the Supreme Court reached the correct decision in Kokesh v.
SEC, this case will likely have significant impact on both the SEC and defendants in enforcement actions. The agency will likely have less leverage
in settlement negotiations and pursue older misconduct less aggressively or
not at all.204 Further, defendants that are ordered to disgorge their ill-gotten
profits will face higher costs because penalties are often not covered by insurance or tax deductible.205
1. New Restraints on the SEC’s Division of Enforcement
The Kokesh decision comes at a time when the Securities and Exchange Commission is facing budget constraints under the current administration.206 In order to brace for the impact from potential budget cuts, the
SEC’s Division of Enforcement has imposed a hiring freeze, a ban on nonessential travel, and has reduced the use of outside contractors for their
work.207 Even before Kokesh, the number of enforcement actions brought
by the SEC was predicted to fall significantly.208 In addition to its budget
and resource constraints, the post-Kokesh SEC will have less settlement
leverage in multi-year enforcement actions now that defendants no longer
face risk of disgorgement for conduct over five years old.209 This reduced
leverage may potentially affect the enforceability of a number of cases, as it
takes a considerable amount of time for the SEC to bring an enforcement
action.210 As reported in the SEC’s Annual Performance Report for the fis-

203. Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 610 (1993) (quoting United States v. Halper, 490
U.S. 435, 448 (1989)).
204. See infra Part II.C.1.
205. See infra Part II.C.2.
206. Matt Robinson & Benjamin Bain, Wall Street Cops Reined in as SEC Braces for Trump
(Mar.
6,
2017,
9:00
AM),
Budget
Cuts,
BLOOMBERG
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-03-06/wall-street-cops-reined-in-as-sec-bracesfor-trump-budget-cuts.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Mary Jo White et al., What Kokesh v. SEC Means for Enforcement Actions, LAW360
(June
8,
2017),
https://www.law360.com/articles/932661/what-kokesh-v-sec-means-forenforcement-actions.
210. See Eisenberg, supra note 192 (“In FY 2015, the average time between opening a matter
under inquiry and commencing an enforcement action was 24 months.”).
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cal year 2015, the average time between an opening of an investigation and
commencement of an enforcement action was twenty-four months.211
With the current and looming budget cuts to the agency, the SEC may
also be less motivated to investigate older securities law violations.212 If investigating an older potential violation, the Division of Enforcement will
likely push tolling agreements on defendants in order to extend the limitations period, but due to its reduced leverage in enforcement actions, it may
be difficult for the Commission to obtain these agreements.213 Further, because disgorgement is considered a civil penalty, the amount of money the
SEC can now take from a defendant is more restricted, for regulations limit
the amount of money the agency can take from defendants through civil
penalties.214 Under current regulations, the Commission is authorized to
collect from a natural person up to approximately $1,000,000 in civil penalties, depending on the severity of the violation.215
The SEC serves the American public by protecting investors and ensuring fair and transparent markets.216 The Commission’s Division of Enforcement plays an especially important role in the agency’s mission by
bringing hundreds of civil actions in courts every year,217 in which the SEC
seeks to deter wrongdoing in the securities markets.218 Prior to Kokesh,
disgorgement was the SEC’s most powerful remedy and brought in more
than double the amount of damages as other remedies.219 However, the
Kokesh decision deals a considerable blow to the SEC’s power to effective-

211. Id.; see U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FY 2017 CONGRESSIONAL JUSTIFICATION, FY 2015
ANNUAL PERFORMANCE REPORT, AND FY 2017 ANNUAL PERFORMANCE PLAN 38 (2016),
https://www.sec.gov/about/reports/secfy17congbudgjust.pdf (listing the average months between
beginning of investigation and filing of enforcement action for that investigation for fiscal years
2011 to 2015).
212. White et al., supra note 209.
213. Id.
214. Peter J. Henning, Supreme Court Casts Doubts on a Potent S.E.C. Weapon, N.Y. TIMES:
DEALBOOK (June 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/12/business/dealbook/supremecourt-casts-doubts-on-a-potent-sec-weapon.html.
215. 17 C.F.R. § 201.1001 (2017); Inflation Adjustments to the Civil Monetary Penalties Administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission (as of January 15, 2018), U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N (last modified Jan. 15, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/enforce/civil-penaltiesinflation-adjustments.htm.
216. What We Do, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (last modified June 10, 2013),
https://www.sec.gov/Article/whatwedo.html.
217. Id.
218. See Mary Jo White, SEC Chair, Address at the IOSCO Annual Conference: The Challenge of Coverage, Accountability and Deterrence in Global Enforcement (Oct. 1, 2014),
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2014-spch100114mjw (“The SEC also concentrates on bringing
new and innovative actions to enlarge our enforcement footprint and to strengthen deterrence of
wrongdoing.”).
219. Antoinette Gartrell, Justices’ Ruling Will Limit SEC Settlement Clout, Lawyers Say,
BLOOMBERG BNA (June 5, 2017), https://www.bna.com/justices-ruling-limit-n73014451932/.
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ly enforce federal securities laws through disgorgement.220 For example, in
Mr. Kokesh’s case, because the vast majority of the disgorgement was for
misconduct over five years old, the disgorgement was reduced from about
$30 million to $5 million.221 Consequently, this decision may significantly
reduce the disgorgement orders for older misconduct, which may harm the
SEC’s mission to deter certain securities law violations and, ultimately, protect investors. Research has found that aggressive SEC enforcement deters
future misconduct.222 Due to the Kokesh holding, however, the Commission will likely be less inclined to aggressively pursue disgorgement for
long-term and well-hidden misconduct,223 such as Ponzi schemes224 and
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) violations.225 In sum, Kokesh may
contribute to a considerable decline in the SEC’s enforcement capabilities.
2. Higher Costs for Misconduct Within Section 2462
While the Kokesh decision likely restrains the SEC’s Division of Enforcement in certain cases, there are also financial implications for defendants in securities enforcement actions. For instance, now that disgorgement
is considered a penalty, insurers may not indemnify defendants that are or-
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dered to disgorge their ill-gotten gains within five years of their violation.226
Courts have previously held that the indemnification of penalties is incompatible with public policy and prevented such coverage.227 And the prospect is not theoretical. In fact, insurance companies began using this argument to avoid indemnifying disgorged profits to those they insured only a
few days after the Kokesh decision.228 Further, many insurance policies include provisions prohibiting the indemnification of civil penalties.229 This
will especially impact individuals subject to large disgorgement orders, as
opposed to businesses, for individuals are often unable to pay the disgorgement without indemnification.230
Along with insurance implications, disgorgement’s classification as a
penalty may also affect the tax deductibility of the civil remedy.231 Under
the Internal Revenue Code, one may deduct “all the ordinary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade
or business.”232 Payments made for court settlements and judgments are
generally deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses.233 Before Kokesh, the tax code allowed defendants to deduct the disgorgement
amount from their taxes.234 However, the Internal Revenue Code does not
allow deductions “for any fine or similar penalty paid to a government for

226. See Andrew Ceresney, The Impact of the Kokesh Decision on Disgorgement For Conduct Within the Statute of Limitations, BLOOMBERG BNA (June 29, 2017),
https://www.bna.com/impact-kokesh-decision-n73014461027/ (describing limitations on insurance coverage for penalties).
227. See, e.g., Twp. of Glouchester v. Md. Cas. Co., 668 F. Supp. 394, 398, 401–02 (D.N.J
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against public policy to allow the insured wrongdoer to shift the burden of payment of punitive
damages to its insurer.”).
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http://www.lawjournalnewsletters.com/sites/lawjournalnewsletters/2017/09/01/reflections-onkokesh-v-sec-2/ (noting the hardship for defendants who lack the support of “their former employer, insurance company or some other source”).
231. See Ceresney, supra note 226 (“If, as Kokesh held, disgorgement amounts to a penalty,
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232. 26 U.S.C. § 162(a) (2012).
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the violation of any law.”235 These payments include those “[p]aid in settlement of the taxpayer’s actual or potential liability for a fine or penalty.”236 This has a considerable impact on a defendant’s costs, for if a settlement or court order is tax deductible, up to half of the payment may be
deducted from taxes.237 However, now that disgorgement is considered a
penalty, the IRS will likely bar parties from deducting disgorgement payments from their taxes.238 In fact, prior to the Kokesh decision, the Office
of the Chief Counsel for the IRS noted in a memorandum239 that a “payment
imposed primarily for purposes of deterrence and punishment is not deductible,” including disgorgement payments to the SEC for FCPA violations.240
Due to higher tax burdens241 and insurance insecurity,242 defendants facing
disgorgement in SEC enforcement actions for conduct less than five years
old may be more likely to settle, and the now heightened costs of disgorgement may also deter others from violating federal securities laws.
III. CONCLUSION
In Kokesh v. SEC, the Supreme Court of the United States held that
disgorgement in securities enforcement operated as a penalty under the statute of limitations and must be brought within five years of the date when
the claim accrued.243 The Court reached the right conclusion in this case
because the SEC used disgorgement to penalize those who violate federal
securities laws and to deter others from committing the same wrongful
acts.244 Further, the Court correctly found that disgorgement in securities
enforcement did not refund victims for their losses or return the defendant
to the place they were before they violated the law.245 Despite coming to
the correct conclusion, Kokesh places new constraints on the SEC’s ability
to successfully enforce federal securities laws246 and imposes heightened
costs on the remaining defendants who are ordered to disgorge their illgotten gains, due to the remedy’s reclassification as a penalty.247
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